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Article 3

STUDENT ARTICLES
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Accounting for
Corporate Corruption?
Ethan G. Zelizer*

I. Introduction
American investors once had reasonable expectations about
big business. Earnings disclosures were expected to be truthful,
CEOs and CFOs were expected to be honest, and auditors were
expected to audit accurately and responsibly. Times have changed.
Scandals at Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing, Adelphia
Communications, ImClone Systems, Tyco International, and dozens
of other companies have caused investors to question the
fundamentals of investing and corporate responsibility. Who is
looking out for the little guy? What is preventing American investors
from cashing in their 401(k) accounts, bailing out of the stock
market, and finding a mattress to hide their money under? Free
enterprise and the public's faith in corporate America are currently at
a crossroads. 1
Investors are consumers of a unique commodity. Rarely does
so much faith and trust go into a purchase. Perhaps na'vely, investors
rely on a company's reputation and a CEO's honor when choosing
their investments. They also rely on the research, knowledge, and
savvy of their brokers and trust that their 401(k) plans will be
diversified enough to withstand market flux.2 Ultimately, and until
* J.D. candidate, May 2003, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; B.A.
Political Science and Peace Studies, Loyola University of Chicago. The author
would like to dedicate this article in memory of his parents, Louis and Blossom
Zelizer, who invested all they had in their son.
1 148 CONG. REC. H5462-02, 5462 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of
Rep. Oxley).
2 148 CONG. REC. E1470-02, E1471 (daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of
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now perhaps unknowingly, investors depend on independent auditors
to practice honest accounting.3 If the recent accounting disasters have
proven anything, it is that investors need more than trust to navigate
the dark seas of corporate piracy. Investors need new protection.
American investors rely on the federal government to quickly
implement rules and procedures when the marketplace falters. For
nearly seventy years, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") and the securities laws it enforces 4 have kept big business
relatively well behaved. Unfortunately, the existing statutory scheme5
did not safeguard American investors from Enron and WorldCom.
Company executives made hundreds of millions of dollars, while
shareholders and company employees struggled with the concept of
how an "accounting problem" caused
6 by "professionals" depleted
plans.
retirement
and
their life savings
In response to the loopholes found in existing securities laws,
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, also referred to as
the Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act
(the "Sarbanes-Oxley Act" or "the Act").7 President George W. Bush
described this new law as "tough" and capable of "punish[ing]
wrongdoers" while "defend[ing] the rights and interests of American
workers and investors. ' 8 President Bush's acclaim aside, the
effectiveness of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act will only be proven over
time. The Act can be applied, however, to what we already know
about the Enron and WorldCom disasters to evaluate whether it truly
solves the accounting and corporate accountability problems that
Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney General).
3 148 CONG. REC. E1470-02, E1471 (statement by Spitzer).
4 See infra note 37.
' See infra note 37 (noting that although the SEC has adapted to new forms of
financial fraud in the past, the corruption associated with WorldCom and Enron
require new measures).
6 See Senator Tom Daschle and Representative Richard Gephardt, News
Conference on Corporate Scandal and Pension Reform (July 26, 2002), at 2002
WL 1730009 [hereinafter Daschle and Gephardt News Conference] (statement of
Steve Vivian, former WorldCom employee).
7 Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley) Act,
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and other chapters (2002)).
8 President's Remarks on Signing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 08/05/02
WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1283 (July 30, 2002), 2002 WL 14547680 [hereinafter
President's Remarks].
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investors recently endured.
This article first examines some causes of both the Enron and
WorldCom disasters. Then, this article briefly summarizes the main
sections of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that affect individual investors.
Specifically, it discusses the provisions regarding audit reform,
increased executive responsibility, new disclosure requirements, and
changes in punishment for corporate criminal fraud. Finally, this
article evaluates whether the Act will adequately protect investors
from future corporate collapses and accounting scandals.

II. Enron, WorldCom, and the Ambushed Investor
When Enron suddenly collapsed in December 2001 amid
allegations of accounting fraud, shadow deals, and the
mismanagement of funds, it was difficult to assess the damage levied
on its shareholders and employees. 9 That damage has now been
estimated at nearly $100 billion.' ° The losses associated with Enron
alone equal nearly all of the investor losses resulting from "faulty,
'
misleading, or fraudulent audits over the previous six years."'
Enron employees and their 401(k) accounts suffered perhaps
the most devastating losses. In late 2000, Enron's stock was trading
at upwards of $90 per share. 12 By late November 2001, Enron's
credit rating had been downgraded from investment-grade to junk,
immediately bringing due $3.9 billion in debt.1 3 One year later,
blindsided by Enron's misdealings, employees watched their
company file for bankruptcy.' 4 By then, Enron had terminated
thousands of its employees, while thousands more faced the harsh
9 The Consumer Impact of State Pension Fund Investments in Enron
Corporation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce and Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation, 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Consumer Impact Hearing]

(statement of Travis Plunkett, Legislative Director, Consumer Federation of
America).
10 Id.

(citing an estimate by former SEC Chief Accountant Lynn Turner).

11 Id.
12

Rebecca Smith, Questioning the Books: Enron's Employees, in a Court

Victory, Are Permitted to Form Creditors' Panel, WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 2002, at
A6.
13 Gregory Zuckerman & Jathon Sapsford, Why CreditAgencies
Didn't Switch

Off Enron, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 29, 2001, at C1.
14Rebecca Smith, Enron Files for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Sues Dynegy,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2001, at A3.
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401(k) plans were worth a small fraction of what
reality that their
15

they expected.

In contrast to Enron's sudden collapse, WorldCom's demise
was arguably more predictable. The telecom giant's stock had been in
steady decline since early 2000.16 By April 2002, WorldCom had
announced layoffs of 7500 employees and cut its revenue projections
for the year by at least $1 billion. In June, it announced plans to cut
another 20% of its workforce and sell its wireless unit. 18 By the end
of that month, WorldCom stock had dropped to under $1 per share
and the sickly telecom giant had disclosed its ailment - it failed to
report $3.8 billion in losses the previous year, effectively turning five
quarters of losses into a profit.' Only three years earlier, the market
valued WorldCom at upwards of $65 per share.2 0 During that threeyear downturn, shareholders and employees experienced profound
losses. Analysts estimate that the decline in consumer confidence
caused by the fall of the company resulted in shareholder losses of
more than $2 trillion, while more than half a million telecom-related
industry employees lost their jobs. 2 1 Like Enron, WorldCom
employees were victimized. They sustained over $280 million in
22
pension fund losses; more than 20,000 lost their jobs.
Other companies wielded similarly crippling blows to their
shareholders and employees. Over 9000 employees were laid off due
to Global Crossing's financial misstatements, and the company's
pension funds lost over $66 million. 23 Rite Aid employees also
watched their pension funds shrink as $145 million drained out of the
24
company amid allegations of accounting mismanagement.

15

Ellen E. Schultz, Enron Workers Face Losses On Pensions, Not Just

401(k)s, WALL ST. J., Dec. 19, 2001, at C1.
16 Andrew
17 Sorry,

Leckey, Taking Stock, CHI. TRIB., May 21, 2002, at B6.

Wrong Number: Endgame, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at A12.

18 Id.

'9 Jared Sandberg et al., Disconnected: Inside WorldCom's Unearthing of a
Vast Accounting Scandal, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at Al.
20 Jared Sandberg et al., WorldCom Admits $3.8 Billion Error in Its
Accounting, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2002, at Al.
21 Sandberg, supra note 19.
22

Daschle and GephardtNews Conference, supra note 6.

23

id.

24

id.
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Likewise, Tyco International stock dropped 80% from December
2001 to April 2002, while several of its top executives were indicted
for various acts of accounting fraud.25
These numbers translated into tragic losses for employees of
these companies. 26 Recently, Senator Tom Daschle brought to the

public's attention a "loyal [WorldCom] employee who believed in
the goals of the company and believed the company's stated financial
results." 27 The employee lost over $400,000 after WorldCom's
restatement of earnings, accounting for most of his 401(k) plan.28 The
losses were caused, as he understood it, by "the actions of some who
appear to have committed accounting fraud., 29 Clearly, he deserves a

better explanation.

III. Causes of Enron's and WorldCom's Collapses: The
Ineffectiveness of the Securities Acts
There is no simple answer to what caused Enron and
WorldCom to collapse. Some say the companies had their auditors in
their pockets.3 ° Others point to greed, dishonesty, and a lack of
corporate integrity. 3 1 Still others view the markets as both the cure
and the cause.32 High risks may yield high returns, but this is not an

25

Christopher C. Williams & Cheryl Winokur Munk, Deals & Deal Makers:

Kozlowski Accused of Trading Gifts, WALL ST. J.,Sept. 16, 2002, at C5.
26 See generally Daschle and Gephardt News Conference, supra note 6
(discussing losses to WorldCom employee of nineteen years, Steve Vivian).
27 Id. (statement of Steve Vivian, former WorldCom employee).
28

Id.

29

id.

30

See

Barbara

Roper,

Consumer

Federation

of

America,

INVESTOR

PROTECTION: LESSONS FROM THE ENRON COLLAPSE AND AN AGENDA FOR REFORM

1-4 (2002), at http://www.consumerfed.org/enron-auditorjrpt.pdf (last visited Nov.
8, 2002).
31 See generally President's Remarks, supra note 8 (stating that "[t]his law
says to every dishonest corporate leader [that] . .. . [n]o boardroom in America is
above or beyond the law, [that the honest corporate leader's] integrity will be
recognized and rewarded [and that] free markets are not a jungle in which only the
unscrupulous survive or a financial free-for-all guided only by greed"). See also
148 CONG. REC. H5462-02, 5475 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep.
Miller) (referring to the "relentless greed" of certain corporate executives).
32 See generally Judge Frank H. Easterbrook's discussion of the effect of the
increased popularity of derivative securities on corporate governance models
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adequate explanation for individual investors and former employees
who lost their life savings. Pension funds and 401(k) plans were
never intended to be high-risk ventures that could be wiped out in one
fell swoop by corporate trickery. 33 Opinions will differ, but Senator
Paul Sarbanes's explanations for the collapse of the two corporate
giants and the wave of corporate scandals currently pounding
investors' portfolios and employees' retirement accounts are
persuasive. Summarily, his explanations include a lack of accounting
autonomy, blurring the line between auditor and
34 employee, and a lack
of executive responsibility and accountability.
Investors are helpless without reliable information - a theory
long adhered to by Congress and federal administrative agencies.
Consequently, the securities laws provide several precautionary
measures including the following: (1) standardized rules governing
corporate disclosures; (2) SEC reviews of corporate disclosures for
accuracy, completeness, and compliance with accounting rules; (3)
collections by credit rating agencies of as much information as
possible to determine the creditworthiness of companies; (4) the
(favoring the promotion of market-place mechanisms, such as derivatives, to
prevent another Enron and noting that, with a few caveats, "we can stop worrying
about corporate governance. Things will take care of themselves nicely .. ").
Derivative Securities and Corporate Governance, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 733, 743
(2002). Although Easterbrook acknowledges that it "would be nice if the small
investors had access to the same portfolio insurance as large ones do," he criticizes
Congress for prohibiting the sale of single-firm futures contracts and preventing
"stockholders [from] protect[ing] themselves." Id. at 735-36. See also the
Corporate and Auditing Accountability, Responsibility and Transparency Act of
2002: Hearing on H.R. 3763 Before the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong.
7 (2002) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 3763] (statement of James K. Glassman,
Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute) (noting that investors protect
themselves "through a simple system of rewards and punishments."), available at
http://financialservices.house.gov/hearings.asp?formmode=detail&hearing=96 (last
visited Nov. 8, 2002).
33 See President's Remarks, supra note 8 (stating that "the only fair risks are
based on honest information" and that "[t]ricking an investor into taking a risk is
theft by another name.").
34 See H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 18 (2002); Press Release, U.S. Senate
Comm. of Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Remarks of Sen. Sarbanes:
Economic Impact of Corporate Irresponsibility (July 8, 2002), at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/prel02/0708corp.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2002)
(stating that "[t]he legislation will strengthen corporate accountability and auditor
integrity.").
35 See Consumer Impact Hearing, supra note 9 (commenting that "the market
cannot function without reliable information" and that "[the system] was designed
to protect investors" from corporate deception).
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creation of audit committees, made up of individual board members,
to supervise audits; and (5) an independent auditor to review and
approve every company's financial statements.

These safeguards

have been in place for nearly seventy years, however, they failed to
inform investors of Enron or WorldCom's true financial state. In fact,
"[p]ractically every element of our system
of safeguards failed until it
37
was too late to repair the damage."
The boards of these companies did not question illusory
accounting practices and, along with their accountants, ignored
ethical quandaries. 38 The SEC had no reason to question otherwise
normal audit reports from top-notch accounting firms; thus, credit
rating agencies were 39left issuing more favorable ratings than these
companies warranted.
With no reason to question financial reports coming from
these companies, the system was subject to abuse. Accounting firms
have historically relied on peer review to ensure quality, and

36

See id. For a detailed look at the current state of Securities laws, see the

Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77 (which primarily governs the registration
of securities); the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (which
primarily governs the purchase and sale of securities, securities brokerage firms
and securities exchanges); the Investment Advisor's Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80-b
(which governs the operation of Investment Advisors); the Securities Investor
Protection Act of 1970, 15 U;S.C. §§ 78aaa to 78fff, 78fff-1 to 78fff-4, 78ggg to
78111 (which primarily governs the activities of the Securities Investor Protection
Commission); the National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77z-3, 78mm, 80b-3a (which expanded SEC jurisdiction and preempted
the authority of the States to regulate certain securities offerings); and the rules
promulgated
by
the
SEC
pursuant
to
those
Acts,
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final.shtml (last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
37 Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Raised by Enron and Other
Companies, Oversight of the Accounting Profession, Audit Quality and
Independence, and Formulation of Accounting Principles: Oversight Hearing
Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 107th Cong.
(2002) [hereinafter Accounting and Investor ProtectionIssues Hearing] (statement
of Shaun O' Malley, former Chair, Price Waterhouse LLP).
38 id.
39 Notably, credit rating agencies have an incentive to ignore the signs and

give favorable ratings when they should not. See 148 CONG. REC. E1470-02, E1471
(daily ed. July 26, 2002) (statement of Eliot Spitzer, New York State Attorney
General) (commenting on a recent investigation by the New York State Attorney
General's Office, which found that credit rating agencies such as Merrill Lynch
based much of their buy/sell recommendations for various stocks not on the
strength of the stock, but on the individual analyst's ability to bring in new clients
and stock offerings in exchange for positive research coverage).

34
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disciplining the profession has largely come from class action and
shareholder litigation after accounting problems have already injured
investors.40 Nonetheless, the accounting profession has enjoyed the
public's trust and a reputation for high standards of meticulousness.
Enron and WorldCom proved that the trust in accountants was
misplaced, and are stunning examples of the securities laws'
vulnerability to accounting fraud before the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
A. Who's Accounting for the Accountants?
The Enron scandal is "primarily a story of executives and
4
auditors deceiving investors about the true state of a business.", '
Between 1996 and 2000, Enron reported an increase in sales from
$13.3 billion to $100.8 billion.4 2 According to Enron, it doubled its
sales in just one of those years and was positioned to double its
figures again in the year it declared bankruptcy. 43 Enron was billed as
America's seventh largest cornany, ostensibly on its way to being
the world's largest by revenue.
So how did Enron go from the top to rock bottom in a matter
of months? The answer is easy: it cooked the books and Arthur
Andersen let it.45 For example, Enron took advantage of an
accounting loophole that allowed the company to use gross value
instead of net value 46 when calculating profits from energy
40 Hearing on 3763, supra note 32, at 7 (statement by the Honorable Roderick
M. Hills, former Chairman, SEC).
41

Id. (statement by James K. Glassman, Resident Fellow, American

Enterprise Institute).
42 Dan Ackman, Enron the Incredible, FORBES.COM, Jan. 15, 2002, at
http://www.forbes.com/2002/15/0115enron.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
43 Id.

"id.
45See Bethany McLean, Monster Mess; The Enron Fallout Has Just Begun.
Things Can't Stay the Same, Can They?, FORTUNE, Feb. 4, 2002, at 93.
46 This device is known as "mark-to-market accounting." Mark-to-market
accounting means that financial assets, such as marketable securities, derivatives
and financial contracts, are reported on a company's balance sheet at their current
market value, although the realization of cash may not happen for years. Testimony
Concerning Recent Events Relating to Enron Corporation: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises
and the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Committee on Financial

Services 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Robert K. Herdman, Chief Accountant,
SEC),

available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/121201tsrkh.htm

(last
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contracts.4 7 It sold the same product over and over again, reporting its
full value in revenue each time. 4 8 Many of the buyers were sham
partnerships created by Enron executives to help generate the
company's outrageous revenues.4 9
Because financial statements and annual reports failed to
reveal exactly how Enron made its amazing profits, few shareholders
questioned the numbers until it was too late.5 But there were warning
signs. To put the enormous numbers into perspective, each of Enron's
19,000 employees supposedly generated $5.3 million in revenues
annually. 5 1 In comparison, Goldman Sachs could only manage $1.7
million per employee, while Microsoft, IBM, and Citigroup
employees generated far less than $1 million per employee.5 2 Despite
their supposed productivity, the thousands of laid-off Enron
employees each received less than $14,000 in severance.5 3 That is
11,000 times less than what former Chairman Kenneth Lay took
home the
year before Enron's collapse - reported at more than $150
54
million.
Accounting fraud also led to WorldCom's financial disaster.
Treating ongoing operating costs as capital investments, WorldCom
reduced its operating expenses by spreading them into the future,
inflating its books by $3.9 billion. Yet, somehow, accountants and
auditors from Arthur Andersen put their stamp of approval on
WorldCom's financial statements. WorldCom said as much in its
official press release: "certain transfers from line cost expenses to
visited Nov. 8, 2002).
47 Ackman, supra note 42.
48

id.

49 Id.
50

This is evidenced by the huge losses sustained by individual investors. See

Accounting and Investor ProtectionIssues Hearing, supra note 37 (statement by

Shaun O'Malley, former Chair, Price Waterhouse LLP, regarding the failing of all
safeguards until it was "too late to repair the damage.").
51 Id.
52

Id.

53Associated

Press,

Enron, by

the Numbers (June

18,

2002),

at

http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/15/national/main512378.shtml (last visited
Nov. 8, 2002).
54 Id.
55 WorldCom Accounting Errors (PanelI): Hearing Before the House Comm.

on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Rep. Maxine Waters).
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capital accounts were [not] made according to generally accepted
accounting principles." 5 Rather than an Andersen auditor, an internal
WorldCom accountant uncovered the company's $3.9 billion
mistake. 57 Corporate accountability was noticeably absent from this
financial debacle; WorldCom stated that Andersen's audit reports for
the last five quarters "could not be relied on." 58 Andersen's own
official statement passed the blame back to WorldCom. 59 The
accounting firm stated its concern "that important information about
line costs was withheld from Andersen auditors by the [CFO] of
that their work for WorldCom
WorldCom. 6° Andersen added
61
standards.
industry
followed
In hindsight, the answer to how Andersen could have gone
astray is apparent - industry standards were lenient and subject to
abuse. An "obvious conflict of interest [is] created when an external
,,62
auditor is simultaneously
receiving fees from a company for nonaudit work.
The conflict is especially clear when non-audit fees
dwarf those received from audit services. 63 A firm's cross-selling of
audit and non-audit services, on its face, is a desirable practice for the
bottom-line of a client, considering the time it takes a firm to become
64
acquainted with a company's business practices and technology.
Importantly, however, a company's relationship with their
accountants and auditors is anything but transparent. Companies have
power over their accountants through their use of "low-visibility
sanctions." 65 If an accounting firm questions a certain bookkeeping
56

Sandberg, supra note 20.

57 Id.

58 id.
59 Id.

6 Id.
61 Id.

Hearing on Financial Institutions and the Collapse of Enron Before the
Governmental Affairs Subcomm., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement by Ted White),
available at http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/031302tw.pdf (last visited
Nov. 8, 2002).
63 Id.
62

Hearings on H.R. 3763, supra note 32 (statement of James K. Glassman,
Resident Fellow, American Enterprise Institute) (noting also that because
accountants are fired by the public companies they audit, the public may rightfully
learns of the accounting firm's misdeeds).
65 Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control of
64
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technique, or if it becomes resistant to what it may deem an unethical
accounting practice, the client may withhold a contract or another
service. 66 These tactics remain under the radar of investors and the
67
public alike; they are far less visible than a conventional firing.
Nevertheless, pressure is leveraged on the auditors, and the company
68
determines who will and will not cooperate. 6 In Enron's case, the
account was just too big for Andersen to lose. 69 The Enron account
in 2001 and was expected to reap
brought Andersen over $52 million
7
0
over $100 million in future years.
Although federal securities laws require comprehensive
financial statements that must be prepared, in the words of the
Securities Act of 1933, by "an independent public or certified
accountant,"7 1 weaknesses in these laws were observed upon their
conception. In testimony given before the 1933 Senate Committee on
Banking and Currency, Colonel A.H. Carter 72 successfully argued for
the independent audit.73 He explained that the independent board
audits the corporate controllers: "[the corporate controller] is in the
employ of the company. He is subject to the orders of his superiors.
He is not independent. 7 4 When Senator Alben W. Barkley asked of
Colonel Carter, "who audits you?" Carter replied, "our conscience. 7 5
As the Enron and WorldCom disasters have proven, an accountant's
conscience does not make a foolproof system.

the Modem Business Corporation: Some Initial Reflections, 69 U.
1233, 1237 (2002).

CHI.

L. REV.

66 See id.
67

See id.

68

See id.

69

Roper, supra note 30.

70

id.

71

The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(27) (2002).

72

Colonel A.H. Carter was President of the New York State Society of

Certified Accountants and senior partner of the firm that was then named "Deloitte,
Haskins & Sells." See Accounting and Investor Protection Issues Hearing

(statement of Sen. Paul S. Sarbanes, Chairman) (citing Hearing on S.875 Before
the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 73rd Cong. (1933) (statement of Col.

A.H. Carter)).
73Id.
74 id.
75Id.
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B. Telling the Public What Companies Want Them to Hear
Audit and accounting reform aside, the Enron and WorldCom
debacles have shown that the securities laws prior to the SarbanesOxley Act did not deter certain CEOs and CFOs from misstating
financial statements and defrauding investors. As President Bush
stated, the time has finally come for dishonest corporate leaders to be
exposed and punished: "[Lt]he Era of low standards and false profits is
over; no boardroom in America is above or beyond the law. ' 6 Before
July 2002, the corporate climate lacked effective laws to delineate
categorical crimes for corporate executive fraud and to establish a
punishment scheme actually deterring such fraud.
In retrospect, investors were naYve to count on CEOs and
CFOs to forego opportunities to loot their companies in the absence
of significant legal deterrents. With stock options galore and the
ability to sign away millions and billions of dollars with only their
own approval, these executives became the ultimate insiders; they
tipped themselves off about opportune times to sell by creating the
environment necessary to profit from it. The harsh reality of inflated
stock hit employees and investors sometime later.
In Enron's case, executives made extraordinary money. While
Enron abandoned its employees with plummeting 401(k) plans and
without a way to exercise damage control, some of its executives
were bringing in millions of dollars.7 7 The most troubling part is that
Enron executives appear to have purposely misled their employees.
In the latter months of 2001, Kenneth Lay, Enron's CEO, advised his
employees to keep buying Enron stock while he sold $70.1 million
worth of it. 7 8 In fact, hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Enron
stock in various executives' portfolios was freed up and sold shortly
before Enron fell. 79 The top 29 executives at Enron cashed in $1.1
billion worth of stock options.8 °
WorldCom executives also received their share of profits as
their company fell. In early February 2002, WorldCom loaned former

76

President's Remarks, supra note 8.

77 Joann Lublin, As Their Companies Crumbled, Some CEOs Got Big-Money
Payouts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2002, at B 1.
78 Id.
79 Id.

'oJohn Sidgmore Testimony Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and
Transp., 107th Cong. (2002) [hereinafter Sidgmore Testimony] (statement of Sen.
Peter Fitzgerald), availableat 2002 WL 1753183.
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CEO Bernard Ebbers $408 million to cover margin calls on loans he
secured with his stock in the company. 8 1 WorldCom granted the
enormous loan so that Ebbers would not have to sell his stock to
cover the margin call, which may have resulted in a drop in the price
of WorldCom stock.82 His leverage on the telecom giant also
translated into an incredibly generous interest rate of less than 2.2%
on the loan, the company's own rate for borrowing.83 This has led
84
some commentators to call WorldCom Ebbers's own "piggybank.
Ebbers is also due $1.5 million per year for the rest of his life and use
of WorldCom' s corporate jets.
While WorldCom's stock price dropped, former CFO Scott
Sullivan, who owned 3.2 million shares of stock, embarked on what
the Wall Street Journal termed "aggressive accounting. ' 86 Although
he never unloaded stock during the company's decline, Sullivan's
capitalization of ongoing expenses may have been motivated by his
own stock in the company. In addition, although the current CEO,
John Sidgmore, adamantly stressed that WorldCom reported itself to
the SEC, the SEC went on record stating that Sullivan8 9and Ebbers
"falsely portrayed [WorldCom] as a profitable business.,
Enron and WorldCom executives tricked investors into
staggering losses. These companies' bankruptcies have left record
numbers of former employees adrift. 90 A select group of individuals
were privy to knowledge and withheld it from millions of interested
parties resulting in countless lay-offs, drained pension and 401(k)
accounts, and diminished consumer confidence. The aftermath of
Enron and WorldCom makes it clear that the securities laws were not
81

Id. (statement of Sen. Ernest Hollings); Sandberg, supra note 20.

82 Sidgmore Testimony, supra note
83

80 (statement of Jon Sidgmore).

Joann S. Lublin, As Their Companies Crumbled, Some CEOs Got Big-

Money Payouts, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2002,

at B 1.

84Id. (quoting Brian Foley, an executive-pay consultant).
85 Sidgmore Testimony, supra note 80 (statement of Sen. John McCain).
86

Sandberg, supra note 19.

87 See Jared Sandberg & Susan Pulliam, WorldCom Revision Tops $7 Billion,
WALL
88

ST. J.,
Aug. 8, 2002, at A3.
Sidgmore Testimony, supra note 80 (statement of Jon Sidgmore).

89

Sandberg, supra note 19.

90

Shawn Young & Jared Sandberg, WorldCom Can Pay Full Severance,

WALL

ST. J., Oct. 2, 2002, at B4.
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an effective deterrent.

IV. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
Congress designed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to protect
investors and fix the loopholes in previous securities laws. 91 To
rebuild investor confidence, the Act focuses on reinforcing the
framework of securities law to restore the reputation of the American
markets as the "fairest, most efficient, and most transparent in the
world., 92 Taking into account the "paper-based system" present when
Congress enacted the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the SarbanesOxley Act reforms existing
law to reflect the use of the Internet and
93other current technology.
The Act can be broken up into five major sections: (1) new
requirements for audit committees and auditors, including restrictions
on non-audit services; (2) new corporate governance standards for
directors and executive officers; (3) extended company disclosures;
(4) increased enforcement and penalty schemes; and (5) mandated
special studies. 94 The provisions discussed below break new ground
in the fight against corporate fraud.
A. Audit Reforms and Audit Committee Requirements
Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act distinguishes between
audit and non-audit activities for the purposes of minimizing the
95
cross-selling of services and limiting pressure on auditors.
Registered public accounting firms may not provide the following
services to the stock issuers they audit: (1) designing and
implementing financial information systems; (2) services relating to
the accounting records or financial statements of the audit client; (3)
brokering, dealer investment advising, or investor banking services;
(4) internal audit outsourcing; (5) actuarial services; (6) appraisal or
valuation services; and (7) legal and other expert services unrelated to
the audit. 96 Section 202 allows for an exception to the general rule
91

H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 18 (2002).

9' 148 CONG. REC. S7350-04 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Paul
S. Sarbanes).
93 H.R. REP. No. 107-414, at 18 (2002).
94 See generally Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
95 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 201, 15 U.S.C. § 780)-l (2002).
9' 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)-l(g)

(2002).
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that auditors not engage in non-audit services, such as accounting for
tax purposes, if pre-approval
is granted from the issuer's independent
97
audit committee.
Section 203 of the Act focuses on eliminating improper
relationships between companies and their auditors by requiring both
the lead audit partner and the reviewing partner on a publicly-traded
company's audit to be changed every five years. 8 In addition,
Section 206 seeks to address the "revolving door" phenomenon by
prohibiting a registered public accounting firm from providing audit
services to an issuer if that issuer's CEO, CFO, chief accounting
officer, or controller was employed by the accounting firm within the
previous twelve months.99 In addition, Section 204 requires the
external auditor to report to the audit committee all critical
accounting policies and practices, alternative treatments of financial
information under the General Accepted Accounting Principles
("GAAP") that have been discussed with management, the auditor's
preferred treatment and its ramifications, and any material
written
1 00
communications between the auditor and management.
Section 301 of the Act amends Section 10A of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 by adding several audit committee
requirements aimed at increasing corporate responsibility and, in
turn, accountability.'10 Under this Section, the audit committee is
directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight
of its auditors' work.10 2 The audit committee must also be composed
of independent members of the board of directors, 10 3 and, under the
Act, a director will not be deemed "independent," if he accepts fees
from the issuer or is an "affiliated person" of the issuer or its
subsidiaries. 104 This fee requirement does not apply to a director who
receives fees solely in his capacity as a committee member or

9' Id. at § 78(j)-l(h).
98 Id. at § 780)-1o).
99 Id. at § 78(j)-l(l). See Consumer Impact Hearing, supra note 9
(commenting on the unhealthy intimacy between the auditor and the company due

to a "constant flow of personnel" between the two).
100 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 204, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)-l(k).
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)-i (amending 15 U.S.C.

101 See

78(f) (2002)).
102 Id. at § 78(j)-l(m)(2).
103 Id. at § 78(j)-l(m)(3)(A).
'0o Id.

at § 78(j)-l(m)(3)(B).
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director. 105
Under Section 301, the audit committee must establish
procedures for the proper handling of complaints regarding
accounting and auditing matters, and for anonymous submissions bY
employees with concerns about accounting and auditing matters.
Likewise, the audit committee has the authority, and must be given
the funding, to consult and engage independent counsel and other
advisors it deems necessary to fulfill its duties. 107 While it is the audit
committee's function to secure the firm for audit services, it is the
issuer's duty to
pay for such services, ideally severing the dollar from
08
the decision. 1
B. CEO/CFO Certification of Annual and Quarterly Reports
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act requires CEOs and
CFOs to certify the following in each annual and quarterly report: (1)
that they have reviewed the report, and, to the best of their
knowledge, it does not contain an untrue statement or omit any
material fact; (2) that the report fairly presents the issuer's financial
condition and results of operation; (3) that the signing officers are
responsible for internal controls and have designed them in such a
way that all material information relating to the issuer and its
consolidated subsidiaries is made known to them; (4) that they have
disclosed to the auditors and audit committee any material
weaknesses and any fraud affecting their internal controls; and (5)
that there have been no significant changes in internal controls that
could affect statements in the future, and that if there are such
changes, of what type and importance. 09 The personal certification
requirement is designed to create a specific deterrent to corporate
executive fraud by instilling personal accountability.' 10

105

15 U.S.C. § 78(j)-1(m)(3)(B) (2002).

106

Id. at § 78(j)-l(m)(4)(B).

07

Id. at § 78(j)- 1(m)(5).

'08 Id. at § 78(j)- 1(m)(6).
"o 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2002).
''0 See Hearing on Criminal Sanctionsfor Corporate Wrongdoing Before the
Senate Judiciary Comm. 107th Cong. (2002) (statement by James R. Doty, Former
General Counsel, SEC, Partner, Baker Botts, LLP), availableat 2002 WL 1721686.
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C. Other Manager and Officer Responsibility Issues
Like previous federal securities laws, Section 303 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act makes it unlawful for any manager or officer to
fraudulently influence or coerce the audit."' Unlike previous federal
securities laws, if a violation of the financial reporting requirements
demands that an issuer prepare an accounting restatement, the CEO
and CFO will be required to reimburse the issuer under Section 304
for any bonus, incentive-based or equity-based compensation, or
profits realized from the issuer's securities that are received within a
year following the earlier of the public issuance or the filing of the
restatement.'12 Additionally, the standard required for a court to
enjoin an individual from serving as an issuer's officer or director is
lowered under Section 305 from "substantial unfitness" to mere
"unfitness." 113
Other lessons learned from the Enron scandal can be found in
Section 306 of the Act, which makes it unlawful for a company's
directors or officers to buy, sell, or transfer company securities during
a blackout period imposed on employee plans generally.' 1 4 A
blackout period is an interval of three or more business days during
which at least half of the participants in the company's individual
account plans are unable to buy, sell, or transfer their stock.' 15 Any
profits made during a blackout
period through illegal transfers are
6
recoverable by the issuer."
Next, taking its cues from WorldCom, Section 402 of the Act
prohibits loans to executives.' 7 Exceptions are made for home
improvement, manufactured home loans, consumer credit, and
extensions of credit under open-end credit plans, charge cards, or any
extension of credit by a broker or dealer to an employee to buy, trade,
or carry securities. 1 8 These exceptions, however, only apply when
...15 U.S.C. § 7242(a) (2002).
112 Id. at § 7243(a).
"' Id. at § 78u(d)(2) (amending § 21(d)(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2), and further amending § 20(e) of the Securities Act of

1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(e)).
114Id. at § 7244(a)(1).
"'

Id. at § 7244(a)(4).
at § 7244(a)(2).

116 Id.
117

Id. at § 78m(k)(1).

118

Id. at § 78m(k)(2).
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loans are made in the ordinary course of the issuer's consumer credit
business, are of a type generally made available to the public, and are
made on market terms no more favorable than those offered to the
public." 9 Banking institutions and their subsidiaries are further
exempt from this section, because they are subject to insider lending
prohibitions and limitations under the federal banking statutes and
regulations. 120
D. New Financial Disclosure Requirements
Reports of changes in beneficial ownership of issuer equity
securities presently filed by directors, executive officers, and
stockholders of 10% or more must now be filed with the SEC before
the end of the second business day after the change occurs. 12 1 Within
a year of the Act's enactment, these disclosures must be filed
electronically and made available by the issuer on its website by the
end of the business day following that filing.' 22 Further, Section 401
mandates that periodic reports disclose material correcting
adjustments, material off-balance sheet transactions, and relationships
that may materially
affect an issuer's financial condition or results of
23
operations.
Issuers must now disclose information regarding its internal
124
controls, code of ethics, and participation by financial experts.
Each annual report must include management's opinion regarding the
effectiveness of the issuer's internal control procedures and a
description of management's role in establishing and maintaining
those procedures. 125 Senior financial officers are required to adhere to
a code of ethics issued by the SEC and immediate disclosure must be
made if an issuer changes or abandons ethics procedures. 126 Also, an
issuer must disclose whether it has a code of ethics for its senior

"9 15 U.S.C. § 78m(k)(2)(A)-(C) (2002).
120

Id. at § 78m(k)(3).

121Id. at § 78p(a)(1).
122

Id. at § 78p(a)(4).

123

15 U.S.C. at § 7261 (2002).

124

See id. at §§ 7262, 7264, 7265.

125

Id. at § 7262(a).

126

Id. at § 7264.
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financial officers' 27 and whether the audit committee includes a
"financial expert." 128 In defining a "financial expert," the SEC must
consider several factors, including an understanding of and
experience with GAAP, the preparation or auditing of financial
statements, experience with internal accounting controls, and an
understanding of audit committee functions, although the
qualifications may become more exact.' Under Section 408 of the
Act, the SEC is now required to review each issuer's periodic reports
at least once every three years. 30
Recognizing the technological abilities of today's companies
and the expectations of the public, the SEC will also require "real
time" disclosures.1 31 Under Section 409 of the Act, issuers must
publicly disclose material changes in financial conditions or
operations necessary for the protection of investors and the3 public
interest on a "rapid and current basis" and in "plain English."
E. Corporate and Criminal Fraud Provisions
Section 802 of the Act creates two new felonies directed at
the unscrupulous executives of the world. 133 The first punishes any
person or company who knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates,
conceals, covers up, or falsifies any document or tangible object with
the intent to obstruct or impede proceedings involving federal
agencies or bankruptcy proceedings. 4 The penalties include fines,
imprisonment up to twenty years, or both. IS The second punishes
any person or company who knowingly and willfully fails to retain or
simply destroys corporate audit records or who knowingly and
willfully violates any rule regarding record retention promulgated by
the SEC. 136 Resulting punishments may include fines, imprisonment
127

Id. at § 7264(a).

128

15 U.S.C. at § 7265(a) (2002).

129 Id. at

§ 7265(b).

130 Id. at

§ 7266(c).

131

Id. at § 78m(1).

132

Id.

133See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 802, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519, 1520(b) (2002).
'34 Sarbanes-Oxley

Act § 802, 18 U.S.C. § 1519.

131See id.
136

18 U.S.C § 1520(b).
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up to ten years, or both. 137 The Act also requires the United States
Sentencing Commission to review and amend the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for the crimes of fraud
38 and obstruction of justice to make
them more effective deterrents. 1
The Act also changes the limitation period on the private right
of action for securities fraud violations. 131 Under Section 804, the
statute of limitations for securities fraud is extended to the earlier of
either (1) two years after discovery of the facts constituting the
violation, or (2) five years after the violation.14 0 The longer statute of
limitations abrogates a Supreme Court decision only a decade old. 4 '
In 1991, the Court issued a 5-to-4 ruling in Lampf v. Gilbertson,
holding that federal securities actions under § 10(b) should be
governed by the analogous one-and-three-year limitation and repose
structure provided for other causes of action under the Securities
142
Exchange Act pertaining to willful manipulation of security prices.
Before Lampf, the courts used longer limitation periods, such as the
five-year statute of limitations for the Insider Trading and43Securities
Fraud Enforcement Act, or longer state limitation periods. 1
Enhanced penalties flourish throughout the Act. Section 807
allows for fines, imprisonment up to twenty-five years, or both for
individuals who knowingly commit securities fraud. 144 Additionally,
Section 1106 of the Act includes increased penalties for individuals
committing willful violations of securities laws. 145 Individuals now
face $5 million in fines, up to twenty years in prison, or both, while
corporations face fines up to $25 million. 146 Further, Section 806
provides long-needed whistleblower protection for any employee
who assists in an investigation
or proceeding involving an alleged
47
violation by the issuer.'
117 See. 18 U.S.C

§ 1520(b) (2002).

138 Sarbanes-Oxley

Act § 805, 28 U.S.C. § 994.

139 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804, 28 U.S.C. § 1658(a)(2)(b).
140

id.

141

See generally Lampf v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991).
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Lampf, 501 U.S. at 360-63 (1991).
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id.

144

Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 807, 18 U.S.C. § 1348 (2002).

145 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 1106, 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
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id.

147 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804, 18 U.S.C. § 1514(a). Specifically, this
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V. Will Increased
Accounting
and
Corporate
Accountability Reforms Prevent Another Enron or
WorldCom?
A single act of Congress is unlikely to erase the causes of
Enron and WorldCom and simultaneously restore investor
confidence. Congress was asked to fill a tall order, but, despite
reported all-out partisan war within each body, it reached a
compromise on nearly every issue. The Act, however, is not without
flaws. In some areas Congress pulled punches; in others, it may have
gone a bit too far.
A. The Accounting Industry Committee Requirements

Audit Reforms and Audit

Large, multi-faceted accounting contracts give companies the
leverage of a powerful paycheck. If a company wants an accountant
to "understand" a particular accounting practice a certain way, as
evidenced by WorldCom, the company may very well get its way, at
least temporarily. As Congress recognized, a strong, independent
audit committee is necessary to address such worries. In that respect,
Section 301 does an excellent job. Because it is directly responsible
for appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of its
auditors, the audit committee is in a position to relieve cross-service
pressures. With an established complaint process, independent
funding, and the ability to retain independent counsel, the new and
improved audit committee under Section 301 is well suited to resolve
potential conflicts of interest.
Congress, however, did not believe that a strong audit
committee alone could prevent an Enron-type disaster. In retrospect,
the Enron and WorldCom disasters might have caused a knee-jerk
reaction in Congress that triggered harsher than needed reform. The
reasonable fear of "low-visibility sanctions" imposed by companies
that accept multiple services from their auditors should not override
fundamental business management. 148 As one commentator stated, "it
is just as easy to bribe accountants directly: just pump up the fees for

Section prohibits "any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor, or agent" of a
company from "discharg[ing], demot[ing], suspend[ing], threaten[ing], harass[ing],
or [otherwise] discriminat[ing]" against an employee in the terms and conditions of
employment because of any lawful act that employee has done. Id.
148 Gordon, supra note 65.
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audit work."' 14 9 Although Enron's relationship with Arthur Andersen
was inappropriate, it was also atypical.150 Andersen served as Enron's
auditor since 1985 and maintained permanent office space in the
Enron building. 15 1 Over the years, Enron and Andersen developed a
"revolving door" arrangement, exchanging a constant flow of
employees. 152 Andersen employees attended Enron parties, wore
Enron golf shirts, and attended Enron ski trips.153 The154relationship led
Enron employees to question who worked for whom.
Although Enron showed the need to separate audit services
from non-audit services, Section 201 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act may
have taken that notion one step too far. Rather than trusting the
strengthened audit committee, the Act duplicates its efforts in a way
that may lower company profits and stock value. The additional
requirement in Section 203 that the lead audit and all audit reviewing
partners change every five years will effectively minimize
Enron/Andersen-type relationships. Further, Section 206 puts
additional restrictions on executives, requiring at least 12 months
between the issuer's employment of a CEO, CFO, chief accounting
officer, or controller and the executive's employment by an
auditor. 155 With these limitations, stark lines are drawn between the
auditors and the non-auditing accountants. Therefore, Section 201's
limits on non-auditing services may be unnecessary.
There is no doubt that Sections 203 and 206 could have gone
further. Section 203 could have required the entire accounting firm to
be rotated every five years. Accountants in one firm have little to no
incentive to report on a fellow accountant in the same firm. As one
firm leaves and another sets itself up for a five year term, the new
firm would have an incentive to locate and report any accounting
problems left by its predecessor. Liabilities don't leave when the firm
leaves; rather, they are imbedded in the books, and become the next
firm's problem. A five-year rotation would give both the incoming

'49

Hearing on H.R. 3763, supra note 32, at 7.

150 Hearing on the Enron Bankruptcy Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Professor John
Coffee, Jr.).
151

Roper, supra note 30.

152

Id.

153

id.

154 Id.

155 15 U.S.C. § 78(j)-1(1) (2002).
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accounting firm an incentive to report problems and the outgoing
firm an incentive to keep everything on the up and up. In the small
world of the "Big 5," reputations will, as shown with Arthur
Andersen, make or break you. Similarly, Section 206 could have
gone further by prohibiting any employee from jumping between
issuer and auditor, or by making the 12-month period longer.
Good reasons exist, however, for why these sections do not go
so far. First, with only five major accounting firms in the country and after Andersen's collapse, four - a large issuer has limited
options. Requiring an issuer to change firms every five years would
ignore stormy relationships between some companies and accounting
firms. Every businessperson knows that the relationship between a
company and their accountant can be fickle, to put it politely. Second,
mandatory rotation of an entire firm also ignores the migration of
employees among the top five accounting firms. Making Section 206
more strict, by requiring issuers and auditors to keep track of or
prevent employees' movements, would be prohibitively expensive
and impractical. It will be far more effective to manage only the
relationships of executives under Section 206.
Arguably, combined with the strengthened audit committee,
Sections 203 and 206 do all that is necessary to regulate the
"chummy relationship"'' 56 between the client and the accountant.
Thus, the prohibitions against the cross-selling of audit and non-audit
services in Section 201 may be unnecessary in light of the harm it
could cause. As one commentator noted, the ratio of non-audit to
audit work for Enron was lower than that of all but three of the 30
Dow Jones companies.' 57 The absolute ban on particular non-audit
services in Section 201 may add expenses, lower profits and stock
prices, and hurt shareholders. On the other hand, having one firm do
several jobs lowers overall costs and makes sense in light of its
familiarity with the company's structure, organization, and
technology. In other words, having a company divide its accounting
work among firms is economically inefficient.
Congress reformed what the business world perceived to be
the proper relationship, while taking the law-abiding company out of
its well-earned comfort zone. After all, public or not, no company
likes too many eyes on its books. Perhaps, the companies who have
kept their promises to the public have earned that prerogative. Simply
put, given the independence of the audit committee provided by

156

Id.

157

Hearing on H.R. 3763, supra note 32, at 7.
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Section 301 and the other controls in Sections 203 and 206, the
prohibitions on non-audit services in Section 201 may simply be bad
business.
B. Financial Disclosure Requirements
American investors need as much information as possible to
make informed decisions regarding their investments, pension plans,
and 401(k) accounts. Likewise, the more information that is rapidly
available to the SEC, the more opportunity it has to prevent harm to
investors. The pre-Act disclosure system forces the consumer to rely
on outdated information. This is especially true in light of how fast
the recent corporate scandals unfolded. With this in mind, the
disclosures required under Section 403 of the Act make sense.
The disclosure requirements of Section 403 can alert the
diligent investor of potential corruption in a company in which they
hold stock. Under this section, sales of stock by officers, directors, or
certain stockholders must be disclosed before the end of the second
business day following the transaction. 158 Given that disclosures must
be made electronically by the end of July 2003, investors will know
who owns what and when. Moreover, under the "real time"
disclosure requirement in Section 409, issuers must publicly disclose
material changes in financial conditions or operations necessary for
the protection of investors and the public interest on a "rapid and
current basis" and in "plain English." 59 By combining a requirement
for more timely disclosures with a requirement for broad
dissemination of that information in easily understandable terms, the
Act improves the value of corporate disclosures to investors.
Further, Section 401 requires full disclosure of off-balancesheet transactions and relationships with unconsolidated entities,
ridding the securities laws of an accounting loophole.' 60 Knowing
that there was less to Enron than met the eye could have saved
investors a lot of money. Additionally, the disclosure requirements
under Sections 404, 406, and 407 of a company's internal controls, its
code of ethics, and the participation of financial experts in preparing
financial disclosures' 61 will increase the SEC's ability to foresee
problems and track accountability.
158

See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(1).

159

Id. at § 78m(1).

"6 Id. at § 7261.
161

Id. at §§ 7262, 7264-65.
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C. CEO/CFO Certification and Accountability
After the Enron and WorldCom debacles, Congress quickly
enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and specifically Section 302, in an
attempt to restore market confidence. Soon thereafter, the SEC
ordered top executives of 942 of the largest public companies to
swear under oath that their companies' current financial disclosures
were accurate as of mid-August 2002.162 The SEC then promulgated
rules requiring the top executives of all U.S. and foreign companies,
including mutual-fund companies, to certify the financial reports they
file with the agency. 63 These initial steps were effective in correcting
investor information, as evidenced by over a dozen restatements,
including significant downward 64
restatements by Nicor Gas,
Household International, and Xerox.
Unfortunately, because it cannot review each of the 68,000
quarterly and annual filings it receives every year, the SEC will
continue to rely somewhat on investors and the media to report
companies that fail to comply.1 65 That is a big problem in and of
itself. Investors who survived the shell shock of the last year and a
half are not ready to be enforcers. Nonetheless, the SEC believes that
Section 302 is "a major step in restoring public confidence in the
markets," largely because executives who do not comply will be "in a
heap of trouble."16 6 The SEC was presumably referring to the
criminal sections of the Act, where CEOs and CFOs face relatively
severe criminal penalties.
Although they hold the proper people accountable for
accounting fraud and provide a strong deterrent, the traditional
securities laws do not go far enough in ensuring that defrauded
investors recover their losses. While seeing crooked executives go to
prison for twenty years may be appealing to average investors, they
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Schroeder,

Deals & Deal Makers: SEC Gives Broad

Interpretationof Rules for Accounting Statute, WALL
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164Taking the Pledge: Restatements Trickle In, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 2002, at
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Schroeder, supra note 162. See also The Money Gang: The Uncommon

Wisdom of Myron Kandel (Cable News Network Television Broadcast, Oct. 21,
2002) [hereinafter The Money Gang], at 2002 WL 4631279 (interview of Myron
Kandel, CNN Financial Editor) (stating that the SEC only has "about two dozen
accountants to [go] through all of this material.").
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may be disappointed at the SEC's approach to recovering their
money. The bottom-line is that the SEC needs more money and better
staffing. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act calls for an increase of $776
million in SEC funding to implement the new laws. 167 Carefully
assessing whether these new funds will close the gap between the
agency's duties and its resources is imperative. The White House's
proposal to cut $208 million out of what the Senate granted the SEC
is already alarming.' 68 This 27% reduction is the type of approach
that clearly undermines President Bush's "tough talk" on corporate
crime and will undoubtedly lead to lower investor confidence.
Currently, the SEC compensates victims by requiring
executives to disgorge ill-gotten gains. 169 Such gains include salaries,
bonuses, and stock option proceeds received during the period when
the fraud occurred. 1VThe disgorgement system, however, is flawed.
Last year, the SEC won court orders requiring executives and
companies to disgorge nearly $530 million,' 7 1 but the agency
collected just $27.5 million, or 5%, of the fraudulent funds
ordered. 7 2 Further, from 1995 to 2001, the SEC collected only 14%
173
of the $3.1 billion owed to it in disgorgement proceedings.
Moreover, when the SEC hits managers and executives, what is left
to disgorge is often a fraction of what has been taken, due to some
executives' free-spending ways and lofty attorney fees. 7 4 The SEC's
official practice is simply to funnel disgorgement proceeds to the
treasury department when they determine it is uneconomical to pay
the victims. 175 Perhaps most troubling to the defrauded investor is

167
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113 United States General Accounting Office, Report to Congressional
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that, although no money is actually recovered in many cases, the SEC
still believes
its court-ordered disgorgement rulings are relatively
76
effective.'
The methods the SEC has in place to compensate defrauded
investors are questionable at best. Through July 2002, the SEC has
won orders forcing executives to disgorge $632 million, but it has
only recovered 12%, or $73 million. 177 Kenneth Lay alone left Enron
with $150 million. 178 The maximum fines of $5 million for an
individual and $25 million for a corporation established in Sections
802, 807, and 1006 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act pale in comparison to
the hundreds of millions of dollars stolen by executives.
Investors should take notice of Section 804 of the SarbanesOxley Act, which extends the statute of limitations on the private
right of action against executives who commit securities fraud.
Private actions fare poorly overall. Over the last 12 years, the average
securities class-action lawsuit has settled for 12 cents on the dollar,
not taking into account attorneys' fees. 79 Nonetheless, the ability to
bring a private action for a significant period of time even after
investors discover the fraud, will lead to more money being returned.
Several sections of the Act simply try to remove the
opportunity for corporate fraud. Notably, Section 402 of the Act
would have prohibited WorldCom from loaning its former CEO over
$400 million at a 2.2% interest rate. 180 Investors should take comfort
in knowing that the executive is on the same ground as the public,
with loans and lines of credit no more favorable than the market at
that time will allow.
Perhaps the most important and most effective sections of the
Act for the swindled investor involve pure retribution. Had Sections
304 and 306 been in existence during the Enron crisis, the company
and its shareholders could have recovered more money. The ability to
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recover profits made by executives during employee plan blackout
periods could have significantly reduced the damage done to tens of
thousands of Enron employees. Further, given the broad language of
Section 304, the amount of money recoverable by the issuer after a
violation of the financial reporting guidelines of the Act may have
deterred executives with the risk of losing all their bonuses,
compensation, and profits realized from the securities of the issuer.

VI. Conclusion
Hours after Enron's crash, while average investors, pension
fund participants, and 401(k) account holders were checking for signs
of whiplash, the SEC and the public began to piece together the
mystery of Enron. Conspiracy theories and horror stories emerged as
the average investor came face-to-face with his most notorious
enemy - the corporate executive. They had never met before; rather,
depending on honor and trust, the investor simply believed that the
man behind the curtain acted responsibly and conducted his business
in a way that would maximize everyone's investment.
The business of managing other peoples' money, information,
and trust is unique to the public company. Such power comes subject
to reasonable expectations, at the very least: thou shall not lie, thou
shall not steal, and thou shall not sell the same energy commodities
repeatedly to sham partnerships while advising employees to "invest
away." In the real world, even reasonable expectations are sometimes
not met, and investors should be prepared for loss, and at times, lots
of it. Yet, when stocks plunge and pension funds disappear due to
corporate fraud and deception, no loss is reasonable.
No matter what effect the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has on stocks,
retirement plans, and pension plans, these investments will never
only be subject to one investor's control. But they should not be
subject to any one executive's control, either. The Sarbanes-Oxley
Act introduces levels of accountability effective enough to deter
corporate fraud. Although they do not put money directly back in
investors' pockets, the new laws take unprecedented steps to require
that companies and executives forfeit ill-gotten gains.
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The Act, however, is not perfect. Arguably, the ban on
accounting firms' cross-selling of non-audit services goes too far and
will cost companies and investors money. Fortunately, however, with
its increased disclosures, new enforcement schemes, and emphasis on
corporate accountability, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act delivers significant
reform and a sign to investing consumers that the curtain shielding
the would-be corrupt executive has been lifted.

